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[5] Contempt-Nature of Proceeding.-Contempt proceedings are
criminal in nature, and the prescribed procedural safeguards
must be accorded the alleged contemner.
[6] !d.-Judgment or Order-Recitals.-The prime purpose of
contempt proceedings is punishment for disobedience of a
valid order directing performance of a specified act, and liability for such drastic punishment should not rest on implication or conjecture but rather on an order expressing in clear,
specific and unequivocal language the act required.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County quashing execution and restraining sheriff
from selling property. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed.
Richard A. Ibanez for Appellant.
Herman Wildman for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Defendant appeals from an order quashing
execution and restraining the sheriff from selling plaintiff's
property. The only question to be determined is whether a
property settlement agreement had been so merged into an
annulment decree that its provision for monthly payments
became an operative part thereof, enforceable by execution.
'l'he trial court held that it had not but the record does not
sustain its ruling.
The parties separated 14 years after their marriage.
Plaintiff husband then commenced this action for ''annulment of marriage and determination of property rights.''
Defendant wife cross-complained for divorce and the settlement of property rights. Thereafter and on July 21, 1943, the
parties entered into a property settlement agreement and
stipulated that an annulment decree might be entered declaring the marriage null and void from its inception. The property settlement agreement provided, among other things, that
plaintiff pay defendant $50 a month for life or until h0r
remarriage. The agreement was attached as an exhibit to
the stipulation, and both documents were filed with th0
court. The annulment decree was entered July 22, 1943.
Following the wording of the stipulation, the decree ordered
and adjudged: ''That the properties and property rights of
[5] See Oal.Jur.2d, Contempt, §§ 2, 53; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 67.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 72 et :sNj.; Am.Jur., Contempt,
§ 78.
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plaintiff and defendant herein are
settled and distributed as per the terms and conditions of that certain
.AGREEMENT dated July 21st, 1943, executed by plaintiff and
defendant herein, a full and true copy of which .AGREEMENT
is on file herein attached to said Stipulation marked 'Exhibit
"A," ' and which is hereby approved by the Court and by
this reference embodied in and made a part of this Judgment.''
Plaintiff failed to make the prescribed payments and became
indebted to defendant in the sum of $2,405. Upon affidavit
setting forth plaintiff's default, defendant procured the issuance of a writ of execution on June 21, 1954. After levy had
been made by the sheriff on plaintiff's property, plaintiff made
a motion to quash the writ, based upon his affidavit reciting
the circumstances of the parties' agreement. Both parties
in their affidavits referred to the agreement as ''embodied
in and made part of the judgment.'' The court granted the
motion, thereby holding that the parties' agreement had not
merged in the decree so as to be enforceable by execution.
\V e have concluded that the trial court's order granting the
motion must be reversed.
[1] The nature of the agreement, its attachment to the
stipulation for judgment, the filing of both documents with
the court, and the plain language of the stipulation and the
judgment entered thereon make the conclusion inescapable
that merger was intended, thereby substituting rights and
duties under the decree for those under the agreement. (See
Rest., Judgments, § 47, com. a; Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Ca1.2d 55,
58 [265 P.2d 865] ; Hmtgh v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 609-610
[160 P.2d 15] ; 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, pp.
810-811.) [2] Since there is no evidence to the contrary,
the trial court's conclusion that merger was not intended is
not binding on this court. (Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49, 52
[265 P.2d 881] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d
825] .)
It was held in the Flynn case that incorporation of a property settlement agreement into a decree by reference does not
preclude a merger. (Flynn v. Flynn, supra, p. 59.)
[3] When an agreement has been incorporated into a decree,
it is as effectively a part thereof as if recited therein in haec
verba. It is of no consequence here that the agreement was
complete in itself, for it lost its identity in the decree. It is
now the decree that declares the rights and obligations of
the parties, for it ''ordered and adjudged . . . that the prop-
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It is said in the majority opinion, relying upon the case
of Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55 [265 P.2d 865], that "'l'he
nature of the agreement, its attachment to the stipulation for
judgment, the filing of both documents with the court, and
the plain language of the stipulation and the judgment entered thereon make the conclusion inescapable that merger was
intended, thereby substituting rights and duties under the
decree for those under the agreement.'' The judgment in
the case under consideration contains no order of any kind
save the order that the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant
is "hereby annulled and decreed null and void from its
inception.'' In the Flynn case, supra, the interlocutory decree
specifically provided that "defendant is hereby ordered to
make all of the payments provided therein [agreement] to be
paid by him . . . and plaintiff and defendant are hereby
ordered to comply in all respects with each and all of the
terms and provisions of said agreement and to perform all
their obligations thereunder as therein provided." In that
case a majority of this court said (at page 58) : ''The question
to what extent, if any, a merger has occurred, when a separation agreement has been presented to the court in a divorce
action, arises in various situations. Thus, it may be necessary
to determine whether or not contempt will lie to enforce the
agreement, whether or not other judgment remedies, such as
execution or a suit on the judgment are available, whether
or not an action may still be maintained on the agreement
itself, and whether or not there is an order of the court that
may be modified under the provisions of section 139 of the
Civil Code.
''In any of these situations it is first necessary to determine
whether the parties and the court intended a merger. If the
agreement is expressly set out in the decree, and the court
orders that it be performed, it is clear that a merger is
intruded. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 165
[124 P.2d 5]; Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 617, 620
[107 P.2d 249] .) . . . In the absence of an express order
to perform all or part of the agreement, it may be difficult
to determine whether or not a merger was intended."
I, of course, am firmly of the opinion that if the decree
does not embody the agr·eement either in substance or in haec
verba, or unless a copy of the agreement is physically attached
to the decree, it is not an operative part of it and may not be
enforced as a part of the deeree. "'I'his is trne PYen though
the agreement may have been introduced in evidence and
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approved
the couri. If the
1s
introduced
in eYidenee as an !'Xhibit, as it nndnnbiedl~· was here [ 42
Cal.2d
, it could be withdrawn or dc'stroyed and
interested parties could not, by searching the records of the
court 'construct a complete picture of the rights and obligations of the parties' (Pn'ce v. Pr·ice, 85 Cal.App.2d 732, 735
[194 P.2d 101] .'
J<Jxhibits may he, and as a matter of practice usually are,
withdrawn, and thus are no longer a matter of record which
may be ''inspected.'' ·when Exhibit ''A'' in the instant case
is withdrawn there is nothing whatsoever in the judgment to
show the rights and liabilities of the parties. In a case such as
this, where there is no incorporation and no order of the
court directing compliance with any of the provisions of the
agreement, any action for relief must be on the agreement
itself which should be accorded the same dignity as other
contracts, but not the same dignity as a judgment of a court
of record. There are here no ''directions in a decree or
judgment" (Painter v. Berglund, 31 Cal.App.2d 63, 69 [87
P.2d 360]) ; there was no order to comply with the provisions
(Jf a settlement agreement in the decree (Di Corpo v. Di Corpo,
33 Cal.2d 195, 201 [200 P.2d 529] ; Cochrane v. Cochrane,
57 Cal.App.2d 937, 938 [135 P.2d 714]; Shields v. Shields,
55 Cal.App.2d 579, 582 [130 P.2d 982]) ; the decree did not
date with certainty the amount to be paid plaintiff (28 Cal.
Jur.2d, § 76, p. 710), and since exhibits are ordinarily withdrawn, the amount to be paid would be a matter of speculation
and conjecture. Why not just take the complaining party's
word for what the defendant owes~ The majority holding
here will lead to endless difficulty-affidavits and counteraffidavits will have to be filed setting forth the terms of the
property settlement agreement since those terms are not
matters of record. In every instance, since the majority has
held, and continues to hold, that it is a question of fact whether
ihe court and the parties intended an incorporation, that
matter will have to be determined and then redetermined by
an appellate court and finally by this court which can say,
blandly and without even a tinge of conscience, that "Since
there is no evidence to the contrary, the trial court's conclusion
[or the appellate court's conclusion] that merger was not
intended is not binding on this court. (Fox Y. Fox:, 42 CaL2d
49, 52 [265 P.2d 881] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131
P .2d 825].) " It is obvious from the concluding paragraph
of the majority opinion that even the majority of this court
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may be
the execution process is involved.
,
implication,
we are to assume that execution may be utilized
indulging
in conjecture and speculation even
there is no clear,
specific and
decree. No other
conclusion can be reached
facts of this case are
taken into consideration.
In the instant case, as has been heretofore noted, the
property settlement
was attached merely to the
stipulation-not to the
the agreement and
stipulation were described as Exhibit ''A.'' \V e said in Bank
of America v. Stan.dard Oil
10 Cal.2d
94 [73 P.2d
903], that" As between the
and the ranch company,
the judgment which is now on
is
an adjudication
that the owners of the bonds originally secured by the deed
of trust, or their successors, are entitled to the trust fund
as against other claimants. It does not completely fix the
liability of the petitioner to the ranch company. 'A final
decree in equity must state in plain figures the amount
which a party must pay in the way both of debt or damages
and costs, as well as every other matter adjudicated.' [ Citations.] ·when the amount is not so stated and does not
appear in the
it cannot be supplied by an
affidavit submitted ex
The
court had no
authority to order a writ of execution to issue upon the facts
stated in the affidavit made on behalf of the ranch company
and its vvrit should be recalled." It was also said: "Before an
execution may properly issue the judgment must be for money
and the amount due and the persons to whom payable must be
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I desire to emphasize that this proceeding was commenced
by the application by Mrs. Poust for a citation directed to
Mr. Poust to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt for failure to pay past due support payments
provided for in a property settlement agreement incorporated
by reference in the annulment decree. .~::\ citation for contempt
was signed by a judge of the superior court and the matter
was referred to a commissioner. It was doubtless obvious to
the trial court that the proceeding was not properly one in
contempt for the reason that no order of court had been
violated. However, a writ of execution was issued for the
amount of the delinquent payments as shown by the affidavit
of Mrs. Foust. This amount could be ascertained only by
an examination of that document and the property settlement
agreement in which Mr. Foust had agreed to pay $50 per
month during the life of Mrs. Foust or until her lawful
remarriage. Nowhere in the decree is there an order that
Foust pay a definite or any sum of money as support or
for such other purpose, nor is there any provision in the
decree to carry into effect or directing compliance with the
property settlement agreement. There was therefore no order
or judgment of the court upon ·which execution could issue,
and the order quashing the writ should be sustained.

